A new report published by the Congressional Research Service on March 6, 2026 lays out the scope of the military operations launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, while also detailing fresh assessments of Tehran’s missile and nuclear capabilities.
According to the report, President Donald Trump said the goals of the operation included preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, destroying its missile capabilities, and reducing the country’s missile industry to the ground. The report also notes that the operation triggered debate in Congress.
Some lawmakers questioned the new military action, pointing to Trump’s earlier claim that the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes had already completely destroyed Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities. Others backed the decision, citing Iran’s efforts to rebuild both its nuclear program and its ballistic missile capacity.
The report includes new assessments of Iran’s missile production and nuclear status
The report says Iran has developed ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, space-launch vehicles, and unmanned aerial systems. Its ballistic missile inventory includes short- and medium-range systems, with the longest-range missiles estimated to reach around 2,000 kilometers.
It also states that Iran mass-produced the Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack drone and supplied those drones to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine. Citing the 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the report says Iran has fielded enough ballistic and cruise missiles, along with drones, to strike across the region, while continuing to improve their accuracy, lethality, and reliability.
Since February 28, U.S. and Israeli forces have targeted bases and equipment linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program. That includes missiles that may have been stored in underground facilities. The report says it remains unclear how much damage those strikes have done to Iran’s missile stockpile and production capacity. It adds that Iran has responded with ballistic missile and drone attacks on U.S. and partner military targets, as well as civilian sites, in several countries.
There are also differing estimates of Iran’s overall missile inventory. A 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency report described the arsenal as substantial. In 2022, then-U.S. Central Command chief General Kenneth McKenzie said Iran had more than 3,000 ballistic missiles of various types. A separate 2026 report put the country’s medium-range ballistic missile inventory at more than 2,000.
Estimates of production capacity also vary. On March 1, the Israeli military said Iran was producing dozens of ballistic missiles per month. On March 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the figure was more than 100 per month. Another assessment cited by U.S. officials, referring to the period before June 2025, put production at 50 missiles per month.
The report says Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure was also targeted during the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli operation and notes that Tehran may have been trying to rebuild its inventory afterward. It points to an October 2025 media report citing European intelligence sources, which said Iran had accepted shipments of chemical precursors for solid rocket motor propellant. In November 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned entities and individuals linked to the procurement of ballistic missile propellant ingredients on Iran’s behalf.
On the nuclear side, the report says Iran has maintained a uranium enrichment program for decades. It explains that uranium enrichment can produce both low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear reactors and highly enriched uranium that can be used in nuclear weapons. Tehran continues to insist that its enrichment program is intended only for peaceful nuclear applications.
The report also says there is still no clear picture of how much the recent U.S.-Israeli strikes have affected Iran’s nuclear facilities. On March 4, the International Atomic Energy Agency said, based on satellite imagery, that it had seen no damage at Iranian facilities containing nuclear material.
Some damage was reported at entrances to the country’s largest enrichment site. The report further notes that the IAEA had been carrying out safeguards activities at Iran’s nuclear facilities, but withdrew inspectors from the country in June 2025 after U.S.-Israeli strikes on sites connected to Tehran’s enrichment program.
Assessments of the June 2025 strikes differ on the U.S. side as well. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy said the strikes had significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear program. The 2026 National Defense Strategy used the term obliterated. At the same time, the IAEA has not been able to inspect the attacked facilities directly, leaving the full impact unresolved.
The U.S. intelligence community has for years assessed that Iran could eventually develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons, while also maintaining that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and had not mastered every technology needed to build such weapons. The report says U.S. intelligence still holds that Iran has not reauthorized the development of nuclear weapons.
It also revisits the restrictions imposed under the 2015 nuclear deal. Under those limits, Iran would have needed one year to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon. In May 2025, however, the Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that the timeline had likely dropped to less than one week.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said in November 2025 that Iran was not enriching uranium to weapons grade. On March 2, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi also said the agency had seen no evidence of a structured Iranian program to manufacture nuclear weapons.
The report ends by outlining issues Congress may consider next. These include reviewing the scope of existing reporting requirements on Iran, including the requirement for the Defense Secretary to submit an annual report on Iran’s military power.
Congress may also consider requiring that report to include more information on Iran’s nuclear and drone programs. Another option mentioned in the document is directing the Pentagon to publish an unclassified public version of the report. Lawmakers could also raise questions on these issues during threat assessment hearings.